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Civil Procedure
Henry G. McMahon*
PARTIES

The husband, as head and master of the community of
acquets and gains existing between himself and his wife, is the
proper plaintiff to enforce all of the rights of the community;
and the wife is the proper plaintiff to enforce all of the rights of
her paraphernal estate. Few procedural rules permit greater
simplicity of statement; yet, in application, few have proved
more technical. This paradox is accounted for by the difficulty
of determining, as a matter of substantive law, when a right
belongs to the community and when it belongs to the paraphernal
estate-of the wife. Since procedure is only a means to an end, and
the substantive doctrines of community property law are simply
rules of control and accounting between husband and wife, and
the heirs and creditors of each, the only justifications for their
procedural application are to: (1) recognize the husband's right,
as head and master of the community, to prevent any unauthorized enforcement by the wife of community rights; (2) protect
the rights of heirs and creditors; and (3) protect a debtor
against double recovery. Yet the Louisiana courts frequently
dismiss actions brought by a wife to enforce a right which her
attorney concluded belonged to her paraphernal estate, but which
a more acute analysis and application of the substantive rules
would have indicated belonged to the community. In virtually
all of these cases, the action was brought by the wife with the
express consent and permission of the husband; and in many,
the facts indicating knowledge of the wife's suit would have
equitably estopped the husband from bringing a second, after
judgment in the first.
With' respect to the enforcement of the rights of a married
woman under the Teacher Tenure Act, the rule as to who is the
proper plaintiff has been somewhat obscure under the jurisprudence. In 1939, one of our intermediate appellate courts decided
that the wife had the right to petition for a mandamus ordering
a parish school board to enter into a written contract of employment, since the suit presented no claim for salary.' Two years
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. State ex rel. Kennington v. Red River Parish School Board, 193 So. 22.5
(La. App. 1939).
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later, another court of appeal held that when the teacher was
living with her husband, the latter alone could sue to recover
back salary due the wife. 2 No guiding decision was available
with respect to a suit where both reinstatement and back salary
were demanded.
Such a suit to effect reinstatement and to recover back salary
was brought in State ex rel. Fields v. Rapides Parish School
Board., The action was instituted originally by the wife; but,
apparently fearful of the effect of the first decision mentioned
just above, counsel had the husband substituted as relator. After
overruling defendant's exceptions, and upon a trial on the merits,
the trial court rendered judgment for relator as prayed for. On
appeal, the Supreme Court maintained defendant's exception of
no right of action, and dismissed the suit. Since the rights sought
to be enforced resulted solely from her status under the Teacher
Tenure Act, their enforcement was held personal to the wife.
After this decision, the wife brought suit for reinstatement
and back salary. Alleging that she was impecunious, and without the means to pay the costs of court, plaintiff sought permission to institute and prosecute the suit under the forma pauperis
statute. The trial court investigated the resources and property
of plaintiff and her husband, found that the latter was regularly
employed and had accumulated some property, and refused plaintiff the right to file suit without the payment of costs. Under
supervisory writs, in Fields v. Rapides ParishSchool Board,4 the
Supreme Court annulled the ruling. With ironic justice, the appellate court held that since the rights sought to be enforced were
personal to the wife, her financial condition, and not that of the
husband, determined her right to the benefit of the forma pauperis statute.
In Sharp v. Sharp5 a divorced wife brought suit against her
former husband and his vendee to annul the sale of property on
the ground of fraud. Citation was served on the defendant vendee,
but the husband was never located and hence was not served.
Neither defendant made any appearance, and in due course the
trial court rendered judgment against the vendee, annulling the
sale. On appeal by the vendee, the Supreme Court annulled the
2.
3.
4.
5.

Riche v. Ascension Parish School Board, 200 So. 681 (La. App. 1941).
227 La. 290, 79 So.2d 312 (1955).
228 La. 148, 81 So.2d 842 (1955).
227 La. 9, 78 So.2d 491 (1955).
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judgment of the trial court under application of the settled
Louisiana jurisprudence that the vendor is an indispensable party
to an action to annul a sale on the ground of fraud. Naming him
as a defendant in the petition without actual citation did not meet
the strict requirements of the rule.
EXCEPTIONS
Some of the greatest difficulties which Louisiana civil procedure has experienced in the past century and a half have resulted from the rules relating to the time at which exceptions
must be filed. Originally, the Code of Practice of 1825 contained
a simple and effective set of rules designed to minimize dilatory
tactics by the defendant. All declinatory and dilatory exceptions
had to be pleaded in limine.6 Declinatory exceptions might be
filed either before answer, or pleaded in the latter before answering to the merits; while dilatory exceptions could only be pleaded
in the answer.7 Peremptory exceptions might be filed at any
stage of the proceeding.8 Yet within a dozen years of the adopton of this code, this symmetrical pattern was marred by the
decision in Magee v. Dunbar,9 holding, in the teeth of the article
requiring all declinatory and dilatory exceptions to be pleaded
in limine, that a dilatory exception might be pleaded after a default, since an answer might be filed at any time prior to the
confirmation of the default. The Legislature acted promptly to
overrule this unfortunate decision, but its action was characterized more by celerity than by foresight. In 1839, a statute was
adopted which impliedly amended article 333 of the Code of Practice by prohibiting the pleading of a dilatory exception after a
default, and prohibiting the pleading of dilatory exceptions in
the answer. 10 Since the code article thus amended used the term
"dilatory action" in its generic sense, as embracing both declinatory exceptions and dilatory exceptions (properly speaking), the
effect of this amendment was to prohibit likewise the pleading
of any declinatory exceptions in the answer. This legislation
opened the doors to the pernicious practice of "stringing out the
exceptions," a reproach to Louisiana practice for almost a century. Jurisprudential "developments" aggravated the evil with
respect to declinatory exceptions. Under the prevailing pro6.

LA. CODE OF PRACTICE

art. 333 (1825).

7. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 336 (1825).
8. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 345 (1825).
9. 10 La. 546 (1837).
10. La. Acts 1839, No. 53, § 23, p. 172.
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cedural theory, a defendant could not object to the jurisdiction
of the court and simultaneously invoke that jurisdiction to obtain
affirmative relief. Hence, no dilatory or peremptory exception,
or defense on the merits, could be pleaded until all declinatory
exceptions (except to the jurisdiction ratione materiae which
could not be waived) had been pleaded and disposed of; otherwise, the declinatory exception was waived." Further, the
declinatory exceptions had to be pleaded singly, and in a sacred
order of priority, under penalty of the waiver of the exception
2
improperly pleaded.1

In 1936, the Legislature acted to terminate the dilatory practice of "stringing out the exceptions." Article 333 of the Code of
Practice of 1870 was amended so as to require all dilatory exceptons to be pleaded "at one and the same time.' 3 Since again the
amended article used the term "dilatory exceptions" in the
generic sense, the effect was to require the pleading of all declinatory exceptions and dilatory exceptions (properly speaking) at
the same time. The defendant in State v. Younger 14 narrowly
escaped impalement by this amendment on the horns of a dilemma. He deemed it necessary to except to the jurisdiction of the
court ratione personae and also to plead certain dilatory exceptions. The 1936 amendment required him to file all of these
exceptions at the same time; yet under prior jurisprudence he
waived the declinatory exception if he did so. Under these circumstances, defendant selected the only possible escape route, by
pleading his declinatory exception first, and then in the alternative, and with full reservation of all rights under the first exception, pleading his dilatory exceptions. This procedure was approved by the Supreme Court, which held that the declinatory
exception was not waived through the alternative pleading of
the dilatory exceptions.
In two cases 15 decided during the past term, the Supreme
11. State ex rel. Brenner v. Noe, 186 La. 102, 171 So. 708 (1936) ; Martel Syndicate v. Block, 154 La. 869, 96 So. 400 (1923) ; Andrews v. Sheehy, 125 La. 217,
51 So. 122 (1909) ; Tutorship of Minor Heirs of Byland, 36 La. Ann. 756 (1886)
New Orleans v. Walker, 23 La. Ann. 803 (1871).
12. The cases cited in note 11 supra, considered collectively, require the following order of pleading the various declinatory exceptions, to prevent a waiver of
one through the filing of another: (1) to the citation; (2) to the jurisdiction of
the court ratione per8onae; (3) lis pendens; and (4) to the jurisdiction of the
court ration- materiae.
13. La. Acts 1936, No. 124, § 1, p. 386.
14. 206 La. 1037, 20 So.2d 305 (1944), 19 TUL. L. REv. 460 (1945).
15. Garig Transfer, Inc. v. Harris, 226 La. 117, 75 So.2d 28 (1954), 15 Louisi-
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Court held that when exceptions to the jurisdiction of the court
ratione personae et materiae are coupled together without being
pleaded in the alternative, the exception to the jurisdiction ratione personae is waived. Prior jurisprudence was relied on for
the decisions. State v. Younger was differentiated on the ground
that there the exceptions were pleaded in the alternative. These
hypertechnical decisions are unfortunate. The Louisiana State
Law Institute, in its projet of a new Code of Practice, proposes
a simpler and less technical solution of these problems.' 6
Two of the past term's cases presented interesting facts, yet
merely called for the application of elementary rules relating to
the dilatory exceptions. In American Insurance Company v. Mr.
Fog, Inc.," three insurers of property damaged by an explosion
allegedly caused by the negligence of defendant brought suit,
under subrogations from the insured, to recover amounts paid
him under their respective policies. The petition described the
plaintiffs as "companies," rather than corporations, so the defendant excepted to the procedural capacity of the plaintiffs to
institute and prosecute the action. This exception was maintained by the trial court, which refused plaintiffs' oral request
for permission to make the necessary amendment, and dismissed
the suit. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of
the trial court on the exception, but remanded the case with instructions to permit the requested amendment. Similarly, liberal
action was taken by the Supreme Court in Pasqua v. State National Life Insurance Co.' 8 There, the beneficiary and the other
sons of a deceased insured brought suit to recover damages for
the defendant's alleged breach of a policy of burial insurance.
An exception of misjoinder of parties was maintained by the
trial court, and the suit was dismissed. The Supreme Court held
that there was a misjoinder of parties, since no one but the beneficiary had a right of action to sue on the policy. It ruled, however, that the court below had committed error in dismissing the
ANA LAW REVIEW 849 (1955); Mitchell v. Gulf States Finance Corp., 226 La.

1008, 78 So.2d 3 (1955).
16. The present nominate exceptions are reduced to three: the declinatory exception; the dilatory exception; and the peremptory exception-with broadened
functions identical with those of the present classifications of exceptions of the
same names. Article 15, Pleading. "The declinatory exception and the dilatory
exception must be pleaded prior to answer or to judgment by default. When both
exceptions are pleaded they shall be filed at the same time and may be incorporated in the same pleading. Neither shall be deemed waived when filed at the
same time or in the same pleading." Article 21, Pleading.
17. 228 La. 15, 81 So.2d 429 (1955).
18. 226 La. 354, 76 So.2d 394 (1954).
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suit, as it should have been dismissed as to all plaintiffs except
the beneficiary.
The civilian doctrine of res judicata is considerably narrower
than the aggregate of the common law rules on res judicata and
estoppel by judgment. Its limitations are set forth in article 2286
of the Civil Code, which provides that:
"The authority of the thing adjudged takes place only with
respect to what was the object of the judgment. The thing
demanded must be the same; the demand must be founded
on the same cause of action; the demand must be between the
same parties, and formed by them against each other in the
same quality."
During Louisiana's early judicial history, the linguistic abilities of the great majority of the members of the legal profession
made the views of the French civilian commentators readily
available, and insured the application of civilian principles exclusively. But with the gradual shrinkage of this linguistic ability,
and the greater availability of common law material, our courts
began to base their decisions to some extent upon the common
law rules applicable to the subject matter, and to a greater extent
upon common law precedents on estoppel by judgment. This was
particularly true with respect to causes of action and defenses
which might have been pleaded originally, but which were asserted only in the second action.19 Finally, in 1940 the sadly confused state of Louisiana law in this area forced the Supreme
Court to re-examine its jurisprudence on the subject. In Hope v.
Madison20 it announced that in the future, with but the three exceptions hereafter mentioned, res judicata would not be sustained
unless all of the requirements of article 2286 were satisfied. Because of the urgent necessity of affording security to the titles
to immovable property, the rigor of the Code provision would be
relaxed, and the judgment held-conclusive as to all matters which
might have been pleaded, in three types of cases: (1) petitory
actions; (2) partition proceedings; and (3) suits to enjoin the
execution of a judgment, or the seizure and sale under executory
process, where no matter of public policy was involved. 21
19. See Comment, Res Judicata- "Matters Which Might Have Been Pleaded,"
347, 491 (1940).
20. 194 La. 337, 193 So. 666 (1940).

2
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21. See Comment, Rea Judicata -

"Matters Which Might Have Been Pleaded,"

347, 513-25 (1940).
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Three recent appeals hinged on the correctness of the trial
court's ruling on the exception of res judicata, and involved an
application of one or more of the rules mentioned above. In
Brown Land & Royalty Co. v. Pickett2 the plaintiff had first instituted a petitory action in a federal district court, based on the
contention that two instruments executed by defendants were
either sufficient to confer title to the mineral interests involved
to their mother, plaintiff's vendor, or to estop the defendants
from contending that they had. After an adverse judgment,
plaintiff then filed a petitory action in the proper Louisiana
district court, asserting that by accepting their mother's succession unconditionally, defendants thereby assumed the mother's
obligation of warranting the title of the property which she had
conveyed to plaintiff. Both the trial and appellate courts sustained the defendants' exception of res judicata. Since the case
fell squarely within the first exception noted above, the first
judgment concluded the parties on all matters which might have
been pleaded in the first suit, as well as all matters actually
pleaded therein.
In Quarles v. Lewis2 3 plaintiff sued defendant originally to
compel specific performance of an agreement to purchase immovable property. After obtaining a judgment as prayed for,
plaintiff then instituted a second suit to recover of defendant the
damages sustained through his delay in the performance of the
contract. The trial court sustained the defendant's exception of
res judicata, and the intermediate appellate court affirmed.
Under a writ of review, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment. Since the object of the two demands were not the same,
the case did not satisfy all of the requirements of article 2286;
and since the case did not fall within any of the three jurisprudential exceptions thereto, the plaintiff was held not concluded
by the judgment in the first suit. To escape the force of article
2286, defendant contended vigorously that the contract gave
plaintiff a single cause of action for its enforcement, and that
under settled principles of Louisiana law plaintiff would not be
permitted to divide his cause of action. The court refused to consider the point, holding that if valid this defense could be raised
only through an exception of no cause of action or a plea of
estoppel, and was not raised by the exception of res judicata.
22. 226 La. 88, 75 So.2d 18 (1954), 15 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 846 (1955).
23. 226 La. 76, 75 So.2d 14 (1954), 29 TuL. L. REv. 592 (1955).
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In Succession of Estopina2 4 a widow sought to open the succession of her deceased husband in Orleans Parish and to be appointed administratrix thereof. A sister of the deceased opposed
the application on the ground that the Orleans court had no
jurisdiction, since the deceased had been domiciled in St. Bernard
Parish at the time of his death. This opposition was sustained,
and the proceedings were dismissed. The widow appealed devolutively from this judgment. Subsequently, the sister sought
to open the succession in St. Bernard Parish, and to be appointed
administratrix thereof. The widow opposed this application on
the ground that the St. Bernard Parish court had no jurisdiction,
as the deceased had been domiciled in Orleans Parish at the time
of his death. This opposition was overruled, and the widow again
appealed. Prior to the argument on the second appeal, the first
appeal was dismissed on the ground of abandonment. Under
these circumstances, the Supreme Court held the judgment of the
Orleans court conclusive on the issue of the domicile of the
deceased.
INCIDENTAL DEMANDS

Under the procedural theory on which the Code of Practice
of 1825 was based, responsive pleadings to a reconventional demand were completely unnecessary, and hence were considered
as prohibited replications.2 The majority of the Louisiana decisions are in accord with this view, though a few cases - in26
taken a contrary position.
cluding some recent ones -have
There was certainly no need for responsive pleadings under the
original Code of Practice, since the reconventional demand has
to be "necessarily connected with and incidental to" the main
demand.2 7 But in 1839 the Legislature relaxed this requirement
of connexity in all cases where there was diversity of residence
between plaintiff and defendant. 28 Thereafter, in cases where
there was no connexity between the two demands, responsive
pleadings to a reconventional demand were needed as badly as
they were to the main demand.
24. 227 La. 434, 79 So.2d 565 (1955).
25. Suarez v. Duralde, 1 La. 260 (1830).
26. A number of the cases on the subject, pro and con, are collected in
MCMAHON, LOUISIANA PRACTICE 624, n. 42 (1939), and SUPPLEMENT,97, n. 42
(1956).
27. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 375 (1825).
28. La. Acts 1839, No. 53, § 7, p. 164, amending LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art.
375 (1825).
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In Loew's, Inc. v. Don George, Inc.2 plaintiff sued to recover
$2,500 damages for breach of contract. Since there was diversity
of residence between plaintiff and defendant, the latter reconvened for large amounts of damages due for an alleged libel, and
for treble damages for the plaintiff's alleged violation of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts. Plaintiff, the defendant in reconvention, pleaded exceptions to the jurisdiction of the court, no
right and no cause of action, and prescription. On the trial thereof, these exceptions were sustained and the reconventional demand dismissed. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. The
exceptions of the defendant in reconvention were held to be prohibited replicatory pleadings; and the court held that there was
no authority for the piecemeal trial of the case. Under the present Code provisions, there seems to be little doubt as to the correctness of the decision; though there is very considerable doubt
as to whether the case will contribute to the effectiveness of the
civil procedure of Louisiana. Legislative relief may be in the
offing. In the projet of a new Code of Practice, the Louisiana
State Law Institute is recommending: (1) the complete abolition
of any requirement of connexity,30 (2) the requirement of responsive pleadings to the reconventional demand, 31 and (3) the
granting of discretion to the trial court for the separate trial of
8 2
the main and incidental demands.
Article 397 of the Code of Practice requires that a third opposition be filed in "the court which has granted the order of
seizure or the judgment in virtue of which the provisional seizure
has been effected." This is simply a corollary of the axiom that
incidental demands should be instituted in the court having jurisdiction of the main demand. Of necessity, however, the jurisprudence has been forced to recognize two exceptions to this rule.
When the third opponent claims ownership of property under
seizure which has a value in excess of the jurisdictional limits
of the court which authorized the seizure, the third opposition
can only be filed as a separate suit in the district court. 8
29. 227 La. 127, 78 So.2d 534 (1955).
30. Art. 52, Pleading.
31. Arts. 46 and 47, Pleading.
32. Art. 50, Pleading.
33. San-I-Baker Corporation v. Magendie, 157 La. 643, 102 So. 821 (1925);
Chapelle v. Lemane, 12 Rob. 519 (La. 1846) ; Stroud v. Humble, 1 La. Ann. 310
(1846) ; McDonogh v. Doyle, 9 Rob. 302 (La. 1844) ; Hagan v. Hart, 6 Rob. 427
(La. 1844). Contra, Oger v. Daunoy, 7 Mart. (N.S.) 656 (La. 1829) ; of. Duffossat
v. Berens, 18 La. Ann. 339 (1866).
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Further, where a writ of seizure has been issued by a court in
one parish, and property in another parish has been seized under
its authority, the third person claiming ownership can file his
third opposition only in the court of the parish were the property
3 4

is situated.

The validity of this second exception was questioned in Reine
v. Orr85 Orr had filed suit in Jefferson Parish to be declared the
owner of a number of hogs in the possession of one Ory. Under
a writ of sequestration, the sheriff of Jefferson Parish seized
some, but not all, of the hogs. Later, Orr learned that the remainder of the hogs had been transported to St. John the Baptist
Parish, so in the original proceeding he obtained another writ of
sequestration directed to the sheriff of St. John the Baptist Parish, under authority of which these hogs were seized. Reine then
filed in the St. John the Baptist Parish court a third opposition,
making Orr and the sheriff of that parish defendants, and asserting ownership of the hogs seized in that parish. Orr excepted to
to the jurisdiction of the St. John the Baptist Parish court on
the ground that since the sequestration had issued out of the Jefferson Parish court, only the latter had jurisdiction of the third
opposition. This exception was overruled. On the application of
Orr, the Supreme Court issued alternative supervisory writs to
inquire into the validity of the trial court's ruling on the exception to the jurisdiction; but, after the consideration of briefs,
these alternative writs were recalled. The majority of the court
were of the opinion that the third opposition was properly instituted in the district court of the parish where the seized property
was located, since otherwise an owner of property illegally seized
as belonging to another would be subjected to the inconvenience
and expense of asserting his rights of ownership in the court
which had issued the order of seizure. Two of the justices dissented, including Justice Hamiter who took the view that there
was no present justification for the second exception to the rule
of article 397 of the Code of Practice. Most of the cases relied
on by the majority of the court, he pointed out, either were
34.
(N.S.)
(1883)
Co-op.
(1858)
Rouge
(1847)
35.

Coleman v. Brown, 16 La. Ann. 110 (1861) ; Lawes v. Chinn, 4 Mart.
388 (La. 1826) ; see State ex rel. Osborne v. Houston, 35 La. Ann. 538
; Oger v. Daunoy, 7 Mart.(N.S.) 656 (La. 1829) ; cf. Gondran v. Nelson
Ass'n, 152 La. 609, 93 So. 918 (1922) ; Donnell v. Parrott, 13 La. Ann. 351
; Copley v. Edwards, 5 La. Ann. 647 (1850) ; Police Jury of West Baton
v. Michel, 4 La. Ann. 84 (1849) ; Galbraith v. Snyder, 2 La. Ann. 492
; Hobgood v. Brown, 2 La. Ann. 323 (1847).
227 La. 1012, 81 So.2d 378 (1955).
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precedents supporting the first exception, or were injunction
proceedings filed at times when means of transportation and
communication were extremely limited.
NULLITY OF JUDGMENTS

The Supreme Court again had occasion to rule that the vices
of form for which a judgment can be annulled enumerated in
article 606 of the Code of Practice are exclusive and not illustrative. In Accardo v. Dimiceli0 suit was brought to annul a judgment ordering the sale of property to effect a partition. The
grounds of nullity of the judgment relied on by plaintiff were
that the appraisers appointed by the court did not take the oath
required by law, nor made and filed an inventory and appraisal
of the property; and that the attorney for the plaintiff in the
partition suit did not notify the plaintiff in the nullity action of
the time and place of the sale to effect a partition. Since these
were deemed vices of form, and are not included in their enumeration in the Code article, the Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of the trial court maintaining an exception of no cause
of action to the suit.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Motions to transfer the appeal to the intermediate appellate
courts were overruled in two cases where an examination of the
record indicated amounts in dispute well in excess of the minimum jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. In one 37 the appeal was
from an injunction prohibiting further violation of a municipal
zoning ordinance. As the uncontroverted evidence showed that
there was a difference of $35,000 in the market value of the property involved for residential purposes and its market value for
commercial use, the Supreme Court accepted appellate jurisdiction. In the other case, 38 under the lease involved in an eviction
proceeding, the annual rental was $1,800 and the unexpired term
of the lease was three years. The appellate court experienced no
difficulty in concluding that $5,400 was the amount in dispute.
Conversely, the motion to transfer was sustained in one case3 9
where the contract in question concerned immovable property
36. 226 La. 435, 76 So.2d 521 (1954).
37. New Orleans v. La Nasa, 227 La. 953, 81 So.2d 7 (1955).
38. Governor Claiborne Apartments, Inc. v. Attaldo, 227 La. 39, 78 So.2d 502
(1955).
39. Francois v. Alexius, 226 La. 978, 77 So.2d 734 (1955).
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worth only $1,500. Similarly, in five cases motions to transfer
were sustained because the transcript of appeal did not establish
affirmatively the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. In three
of these cases; 40 only injunctive relief had been demanded by
the plaintiff, and nothing in the record indicated the value of
the rights involved. In a fourth4 ' plaintiff's primary demand was
for the possession of immovables, with nothing in the record indicating the value of the possessory rights sought to be enforced.
As appellate jurisdiction is determined by the appealable main
demand, the court held that plaintiff's alternative demand for
$3,000 damages could not be considered for purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction. In the fifth 42 of this group of cases
the Supreme Court continued its practice of disregarding affidavits showing, and stipulations of the parties agreeing to, the
facts establishing the amount in dispute. The writer heretofore 43
has deplored the court's discontinuance of its practice over a
period of years of considering the facts thus established, as an
abdication by the Supreme Court of its "original jurisdiction for
the determination of questions of fact affecting its own appellate
jurisdiction in any case pending before it," 44 and further elaboration of the subject here is unnecessary.
In three cases 45 decided during the past term, the Supreme
Court held that the intermediate courts of appeal had no authority to remand a case to the trial court to receive evidence showing the amount in dispute so as to determine appellate jurisdiction definitely. In two of these46 the cases had been remanded
after their transfer to the courts of appeal by the Supreme Court.
In both, the Supreme Court made it abundantly clear to the intermediate appellate courts that "where MacGregor sits is the head
of the table."
Five decisions presented questions as to the appellant's right
40. Dr. G. H. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann Brothers Giant Super
Markets, 227 La. 833, 79 So.2d 77 (1955) ; Gamburg v. City of Alexandria, 227
La. 687, 80 So.2d 372 (1955) ; New Orleans v. Langenstein, 227 La. 770, 80 So.2d
402 (1955).
41. Dixon v. Zemurray, 227 La. 457, 79 So.2d 738 (1953).
42. H. G. Hill Stores Realty Co. v. Latter, 227 La. 791, 80 So.2d 410 (1955).
43. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1952-1953 Term Civil Procedure, 14 LouISIANA LAW REVIEW 198, 209-12 (1953).
44. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 10.
45. State ex rel. Wood v. Davis-Wood Lumber Co., 228 La. 55, 81 So.2d 767
(1955) ; Ilardo v. Agurs, 226 La. 613, 76 So.2d 904 (1954) ; Beene v. Pardue, 226
La. 606, 76 So.2d 902 (1954).
46. State em rel. Wood v. Davis-Wood Lumber Co., 228 La. 55, 81 So.2d 767
(1955) ; Beene v. Pardue, 226 La. 606, 76 So.2d 902 (1954).
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to appeal. In one case, 47 involving a confusing and complicated
set of facts and figures, the court denied a motion to dismiss
grounded on the contention that appellant had confessed judicially the judgment appealed from. Justification of the court's ruling is afforded by the fact that there is some doubt as to whether
the judicial admissions made by appellant in the trial court were
unconditional. In another case48 the Supreme Court dismissed
a devolutive appeal from the judgment rendered in a jactitory
acton, ordering defendant either to disclaim title to the property
or to assert title thereto judicially within sixty days. In view of
the appellant's subsequent institution of a petitory action within
the judicial delay allowed, the court held that appellant had
acquiesced in the judgment appeal from. In a third case, 49 the
court denied a motion to dismiss the appeal prosecuted by an
intervenor from an adverse judgment of the trial court overruling his motion to dissolve an attachment of funds standing in the
name of defendant. After rendition of the judgment appealed
from, the appellant filed a third opposition, and subsequently
discontinued it. This discontinuance of the third opposition was
the basis for appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal on the
ground of appellant's acquiescence in the judgment appealed
from. In any decision of the appeal on its merits, counsel and
the court will have considerable difficulties in unraveling the
procedural snarl presented; but the court's finding that there
was no clear, unconditional, and absolute acquiescence by appellant in the judgment appealed from appears unexceptionable.
In the third 50 of this group of cases, the appeal had been
prosecuted by counsel for the plaintiff from an adverse judgment approving a compromise settlement affecting two-thirds
of the mineral interest involved. Under the employment contract
between appellants and the plaintiff, the former were to receive
a one-third interest in the mineral rights, and neither of the contracting parties were to have any right to compromise the case
without the consent of the others. Contending that the compromise settlement covered only the plaintiff's interest in the litigation, and that the appellants were left free to continue the prosecution of their own one-third interest, plaintiff moved to dis47. J. R. Quaid, Inc. v. Cyclone Fence Co., 226 La. 398, 76 So.2d 409 (1954).
48. Navarre v. Lafayette Parish School Board, 226 La. 876, 77 So.2d 520
(1955).
49. Delafield v. Ross, 226 La. 892, 77 So.2d 526 (1955).
50. Acadian Production Corp. v. Savanna Corp., 226 La. 849, 77 So.2d 417
(1954).
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miss the appeal. Pointing out that the validity of the compromise
agreement was the very point which the court would have to
decide when it considered the appeal on its merits, the Supreme
Court denied the motion to dismiss. In the last5 1 of the cases,
under a writ of review, the Supreme Court reversed a judgment
of the court of appeal dismissing a devolutive appeal from a judgment ordering a sale of property to effect a partition, when the
latter had been sold pending the appeal. The intermediate appellate court based its action on the settled jurisprudence holding such a sale valid, regardless of the appeal. What the court of
appeal had overlooked, however, was that in the trial court appellant had asserted full ownership of the property, and that
hence his right to claim all of the proceeds of the sale was still
subject to review.
During each term of court at least one appeal is dismissed
because of the failure of appellant to file the transcript timely.
This past term's case of that nature12 is noteworthy only because
of its interesting facts. Prior to the return day here, appellant
obtained an extension of time to file the record from the court
of appeal. Before this extended return day, appellant again applied to that court for an extension, but the application was
denied by the intermediate appellate court on the ground that the
appeal granted by the trial judge was to the Supreme Court. Notwithstanding this, appellant obtained appellee's signature to a
stipulation concerning the filing of exhibits on appeal. Then
appellant applied to the Supreme Court for an extension of time
for filing the transcript, alleging that appellee had acquiesced
in the appeal by executing the stipulation. This extension was
granted, but the Supreme Court expressly reserved all of appellee's acquired rights to dismiss the appeal. The transcript of
appeal was subsequently lodged with the Supreme Court. The
latter, on the appellee's motion, dismissed the appeal. In answer
to appellant's principal argument, the court recognized the rule
that an appellee may acquiesce in the late filing of a transcript
of appeal, but held that such acquiescence must consist of some
action taken by the appellee in the appellate court, and after the
transcript of appeal had been filed there.
Three cases involved irregularities in the appeal bond or the
51. Fluker Farms, Inc. v. James, 226 La. 303, 76 So.2d 311 (1954).
52. Southern Premium Service v. Oddo, 226 La. 95, 75 So.2d 20 (1954).
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time of its filing. In one5 3 the court denied a motion to dismiss

the appeal on the ground that the appeal bond was not conditioned as required by statute. The complaint had not been filed
in the trial court as required by statute, so as to afford appellee
an opportunity to correct the irregularity. In the other two
cases,5 4 where the suspensive appeal bond had not been filed
within the delay allowed by the Code, the appeal was dismissed
insofar as it suspended the execution of the judgment appealed
from, but was otherwise sustained as a devolutive appeal.
Motions to dismiss the appeal filed in two cases were grounded on the alleged failure of appellant to join one of plural appellees. In Krauss Co. v. Manton55 the order of appeal was granted
on petition, and no citation of appeal was prayed for, issued, or
served on one of the appellees. Under the settled jurisprudence,
the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. But in New Orleans v.
Peterson56 the order of appeal was granted on motion in open
court, and hence required no citation of appeal on the appellees.
Although the motion of appeal mentioned the judgment only insofar as it affected one of the appellees, this was held immaterial
since the appeal was taken with respect to all parties. Earlier
cases dismissing the appeal when the appeal bond was in favor
of only one appellee were distinguished. Under the present law,
the appeal bond must be in favor of the clerk of court and inures
to the benefit of all interested parties. The motion to dismiss
was denied.
A somewhat similar question was presented in Howard v.
Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co. 57 There, plaintiff sued six defend-

ants to recover property damage to his automobile. Under an
exception of no cause of action the suit was dismissed as to the
defendant Guillory. After trial on the merits, judgment was
rendered in favor of plaintiff and against Mrs. Guillory, otherwise rejecting plaintiff's demands. Both plaintiff and Mrs. Guillory appealed. The court of appeal rendered judgment in favor
of plaintiff and against Mr. and Mrs. Guillory, in solido; but
otherwise the judgment appealed from was affirmed. Under a
53. Governor Claiborne Apartments, Inc. v. Attaldo, 227 La. 39, 78 So.2d 502
(1955), noted on another point page 371, supra.
54. Ramizest v. Ramizest, 226 La. 973, 77 So.2d 733 (1955), 15 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 845; Probst v. DiGiovanni, 226 La. 625, 76 So.2d 909 (1954).
55. 227 La. 1, 78 So.2d 489 (1955).
56. 226 La. 967, 77 So.2d 730 (1955).
57. 226 La. 346, 76 So.2d 391 (1954).
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writ of review, this judgment was annulled by the Supreme
Court. The written motion of plaintiff was for an appeal from
the judgment of the trial court only so far as it was favorable
to the other four defendants. In this respect, the differentiation
of this case from New Orleans v. Petersonis not entirely free of
difficulty. But there can be no doubt but that the judgment of
the court of appeal was erroneous. On the overruling of his exception Guillory had a right to answer over and go to trial on
the merits of the case.
When a Louisiana appellate court exercises its statutory privilege of transferring an appeal to the appellate court of proper
jurisdiction, it conditions the transfer upon it being effected
within a stipulated delay. In an earlier case, 58 the Supreme Court
had held that this delay commences to run only on the expiration of the delay for applying for a rehearing in the transferring
5 9
court. This rule was affirmed in Cardos v. Cristadoro
To
escape the force and effect of the prior decision, the appellee
contended that here the appellant had waived any right to apply
for a rehearing by moving himself for the transfer. The Supreme
Court demonstrated the unsoundness of this position by pointing out that appellee had moved to dismiss the appeal, or, in
the alternative, for its transfer; and since the relief primarily
moved for by appellee had been denied, the judgment could not
become final until the expiration of the delay for the appellee
to apply for a rehearing.
R.S. 13:4431 grants the right of a suspensive appeal to any
defendant in a case where a trial court has granted any injunctive order restraining the execution or performance of any provision of the Constitution, statute, or legislative resolution of
Louisiana. As declared by the Supreme Court, 0 the purpose of
the statute "is to prevent the district courts from restraining
the execution or enforcement of any provision of the Constitution or- any act, law or resolution of the Legislature until it is
declared invalid or unconstitutional by final decisions of the
courts."
In two cases decided during the past term, the application of
the statute was invoked by defendants to obtain suspensive appeals from orders of trial courts restraining the execution or
58. Mitchum v. Mitchum, 184 La. 111, 165 So. 635 (1935).
59. 226 La. 351, 76 So.2d 392 (1954).
60. In Wall v. Close, 201 La. 986, 996, 10 So.2d 779, 783 (1942).
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enforcement of statutes. In Guillot v. Nunez6' the Supreme Court
refused to order a trial court to grant a suspensive appeal from
an order enjoining the Director of the State Police from discharging his statutory duty of destroying two slot machines. In
a per curiam opinion, the court held that while the statute granting the suspensive appeal was couched in all-inclusive language,
to construe it as being absolute and without exception might
call in question its constitutionality, since relator would destroy
the slot machines pending a suspensive appeal and thus make
the case moot. Under the facts, the injunctive order was held
not such an interference with relator's performance of his duties
as to affect the orderly operation of his office, particularly since
the status quo would be maintained pending a devolutive appeal.
In Hirt v. New Orleans6 2 the Supreme Court applied the statute
and ordered the trial court to grant a suspensive appeal from a
preliminary injunction restraining the mayor and councilmen
from investigating the police department, because of the alleged
unconstitutionality of the legislative charter provision authorizing such investigations. The Nunez case was differentiated on
its facts. Here, according to the Supreme Court's per curiam
no property rights were involved; and because of the public
importance of the case, the city officials should not be prevented
from performing these important statutory duties until the
charter provision assailed had been held unconstitutional by a
final decision. The writer agrees intuitively and completely with
the results in both cases; but he shares the supreme judiciary's
difficulties in distinguishing the two cases convincingly.
THE JACTITORY ACTION

In Cattle Farms v. Succession of Pautsch3 plaintiffs brought
suits to have the inscriptions of registry of certain mineral conveyances cancelled and removed from the conveyance records on
the ground that they constituted clouds on plaintiffs' titles. Cancellation of the registry of these instruments was sought on the
ground that the mineral and royalties interests conveyed had
prescribed. Defendants interposed pleas of estoppel based upon
an agreement of compromise and an after-acquired title of the
plaintiff. On a hearing, the trial court sustained the pleas of
estoppel and dismissed the suits. On appeal, the Supreme Court
61. 225 La. 1035, 74 So.2d 205 (1953).
62. 225 La. 1077, 74 So.2d 380 (1953).
63. 228 La. 1, 81 So.2d 424 (1955).
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reversed. It characterized the actions brought by plaintiffs as
jactitory actions, and applied the settled rule that, unless possession is at issue, the only judgment which a court can render
against a defendant in a petitory action is one requiring him
to assert title to the property in question. Hence, the defense
based on the compromise agreement and after-acquired title
could be considered only on the trial on the merits of plaintiffs'
subsequent petitory actions. In a per curiam denying defendants' applications for rehearing, the court receded appreciably
from its positions in the original opinion. Characterization of
the plaintiffs' suits was now held to be immaterial; and the expression of the view in the original opinion that these suits
were jactitory actions was now to be regarded as an ineffective
obiter dictum. The important point in the original opinion was
the holding that the issues involved in the pleas of estoppel could
be considered only on the trial of the case on its merits; and as
this position was still adhered to, the applications for rehearing
were denied.
EXECUTORY PROCESS
The seizure and sale of property under executory process
has long been regarded in Louisiana as a harsh remedy, hence
the strict requirement of a long line of cases that every single
link in the chain of evidence needed to prove the creditor's right
to resort to an executory proceeding must be submitted in authentic form. In Myrtle Grove Packing Co. v. Mones0 4 the plaintiff
appealed from a judgment enjoining the sale of a vessel under
executory process. No written reasons for judgment were rendered by the trial court, but from an examination of the record
the Supreme Court concluded that the judgment appealed from
should be affirmed on two grounds: (1) the note evidencing
the indebtedness and the act importing the confession of judgment had not been presented to the trial court at the time it rendered the order of seizure and sale; and (2) there was a variance
and discrepancy between this note and the one described in the
act of mortgage.
On rehearing, counsel for appellee admitted that, though the
record did not so indicate, the note evidencing the indebtedness
and the act importing the confession of judgment had been
submitted to the trial court at the time it rendered the order
64. 226 La. 287, 76 So.2d 305 (1954).
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of seizure and sale, so this point passed out of the case. The
court, however, held that, under the settled jurisprudence, the
variance between the note and its description in the act of mortgage was sufficient grounds for arresting the seizure and sale.6 The court refused to accept the appellant's argument that, since
the injunction to arrest the seizure and sale had been sought in
the trial court on the ground that there had been an extension
of time granted for the payment of the indebtedness, the debtor
had waived his right to object to the executory proceeding because of the variance between the note and its description in
the act of mortgage. A sufficient answer thereto was found in
the century-old rule that the appellate court may notice grounds
for arresting the seizure and sale other than those urged by the
plaintiff in injunction."
SUCCESSION PROCEDURE
Succession of Roth6T involved an unusual procedure. The opponents of the alleged testament of the deceased opposed its
probate on numerous grounds, one of which was that, should the
court find the will to be entirely written and signed by the testatrix, then it was invalid because certain language therein had
been written much later than the remainder of the testament
and the date indicated thereon. They applied to the lower court
to have the disputed will sent to the University of California at
Berkeley to have certain recently-developed tests made with apparatus which could be found only there, to determine the age
of the ink or inks used in writing the testament. The lower court
refused to grant the application, and the opponents applied to
the Supreme Court for supervisory writs to coerce the trial
court into rendering the necessary order. The proponents of the
will filed affidavits in the appellate court that these tests could
be made with apparatus in Louisiana. The Supreme Court refused to pass upon the issue of fact thus raised, but remanded
the case to the lower court for a determination of the question.
65. LA. R.S. 13:4104, 4105 (1950) authorizes the rectification of a discrepancy
between the note and mortgage by the notary, debtor, or heirs of the latter. No
statutory rectification of the discrepancy had been made in this case.
66. The opinion on rehearing further approved the holding in General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Anzelmo, 222 La. 1019, 64 So.2d 417 (1953), 14 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 289, that the lack of sufficient authentic evidence to justify the order
of seizure and sale might be raised through an application for injunction to arrest
the seizure and sale.
67. 227 La. 1058, 81 So.2d 394 (1955).
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Article 966 of the Civil Code provides that:
"Persons unworthy of inheriting, and, as such, deprived
of the succession to which they are called are the following:
"1. Those who are convicted of having killed, or attempted
to kill, the deceased; ....
"2. Those who have brought against the deceased some
accusation found calumnious, which tended to subject the deceased to an infamous or capital punishment.
"3. Those who, being apprised of the murder of the deceased, have not taken measures to bring the murderer to justice." (Emphasis added.)
In Sharp v. Sharp68 the plaintiff brothers and sister of the
deceased sought to have the widow declared unworthy of inheriting and, as such, deprived of his succession. Their petition
alleged that the deceased was intentionally shot and killed by
his wife pursuant to a plan to kill him which had been in existence for several months. The defendant's exception of no cause
of action, sustained by the trial court, was levelled at the failure
of the petition to allege the conviction of defendant for her husband's murder. (Apparently, it was admitted that a grand jury
had inquired into the possibility of her guilt, and had returned
a "no true bill.") At the time the exception was sustained by
the trial court, counsel for plaintiffs sought orally to amend the
petition by dictating into the minutes of the court allegations
seeking to bring the case within the third enumeration of the
Code provision. The trial judge refused to permit this oral
amendment, and dismissed the suit. For obvious reasons, the
judgment of dismissal appealed from was affirmed.
JUDICIAL PARTITIONS

The most important point in this area of our procedural law
considered during the past term was presented in Succession of
0
Fertel v. Fertel."
The question presented to the appellate court
was the validity of the trial court's judgment ordering the sale
of a number of immovable properties to effect a partition, insofar as it ordered the auctioneer to offer two parcels together,
offer two other parcels separately, then re-offer the four parcels
en globo, and to accept the highest bid or aggregate of bids. The
68. 228 La. 89, 81 So.2d 820 (1955).
69. 226 La. 307, 76 So.2d 377 (1954).
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trial court's reason for ordering the sale of the first two parcels
together was that both were subject to the same long-term lease,
and he doubted that a separate sale of the two properties would
be practicable, or even possible. Its reason for requiring the
auctioneer to offer the properties first separately, and then en
globo, and to accept the highest bid or aggregate of bids, was
that it would result in higher prices than otherwise might be
obtained. No case precedent, or express or statutory provision,
authorized such a sale. On the original hearing, the majority of
the justices of the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from. Sufficient authority for the challenged action of
the trial court was found in the numerous cases on the subject
in other American jurisdictions, and in the general language of
article 1336 of the Civil Code, empowering the trial court to
regulate the mode of the sale to effect a partition as would appear to it most convenient and most advantageous to the owners.
Justice Moise disagreed, and in his dissenting opinion pointed
out that the discretion vested in the trial court by article 1336
was not plenary, but expressly required conformity with the
other Code provisions; and that no provision of the positive law
authorized such a sale to effect a partition. On rehearing, the
majority of the members of the court reversed the judgment appealed from, and held that the issue of the desirability of offering the properties as directed had never been presented to the
trial court; and that since both the inventory and the pleadings
listed the properties separately and contemplated their separate
sale, the trial court had no authority to direct any other mode
of sale. The majority opinion does not expressly hold that there
is no authority in Louisiana law for such a judicial sale, but it
appears to the writer that the whole tenor thereof rejects the
existence of the necessary authority therefor. Justice McCaleb
(the writer of the original opinion) and Justice Hawthorne dissented on rehearing, and expressed their adherence to the original opinion.
As a matter of strict legal theory, it appears that the majority opinion on rehearing is correct; but as a practical matter,
it is to be regretted that trial courts do not have the authority
exercised in this case. The probabilities are that the Louisiana
State Law Institute will recommend a grant of such authority
70
in all cases of judicial sales.
70. The procedure for effecting judicial partitions has not yet been considered
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In Kelly v. Moore7' plaintiffs sued to effect partitions by
licitation of both urban and rural properties. The eight defendants and plaintiffs were the owners of the urban property; while
the plaintiffs and four of these defendants owned the rural land
jointly. Only one of the defendants appealed from a judgment
ordering the sale of both the urban and rural properties to effect
partitions. In the appellate court, appellant filed exceptions of
no right and no cause of action, insofar as the suit affected the
rural land, on the ground that since the institution of suit appellant had acquired all of plaintiffs' interest therein. Since the
plaintiffs had a justiciable interest at the time suit was instituted,
and as the judgment was final as to those defendants who had
not appealed therefrom, the Supreme Court overruled these exceptions. No reversible error of the trial court appearing from
the record, the judgment appealed from was affirmed.
A judgment ordering the partition of a tract of land by lici72
tation, rather than in kind, was appealed from in another case.
The fact that there were a number of absent heirs of two of the
deceased co-owners was known, but the identities, addresses,
and number of these absent heirs was unknown at the time the
partition by licitation was ordered. Consequently, it could not
have been determined at the time how many lots had to be drawn,
and how the land might be divided in kind. This, plus the fact
that the tract consisted of both low and high lands, and arable
and timber lands, were held sufficient to affirm the judgment
appealed from, requiring that the property be sold to effect the
partition.
Until 1954, the venue of an action brought by a divorced or judicially separated spouse to partition immovable property belonging to the dissolved community was either in the parish where the
judgment of divorce or separation was rendered, or in the parish
7
where the property was situated, at the option of the plaintiff. 8
by the Council of the Law Institute. However, in its adoption of article 10 on
Execution of Judgments, the Council has recommended a similar adjudication procedure, when requested by the judgment debtor or when the aggregate of bids on
all the property separately is insufficient to satisfy the judgment. In acting upon
the provisions of this proposed article, and in the debates thereon, the Council
considered the arguments pro and con on the question. Its decision on article 10
probably will be considered decisive with respect to all other judicial sales, to the
extent of granting the trial court discretion to order such adjudication procedure.
71. 225 La. 1072, 74 So.2d 379 (1954).
72. Cain v. Boudousque, 227 La. 333, 79 So.2d 328 (1955).
73. Of. Demoruelle v. Allen, 218 La. 603, 50 So.2d 208 (1950).
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In 1954 a statute74 was enacted providing that all actions to partition a community dissolved by a judgment of divorce or separation must be brought in the parish of the last Louisiana matrimonial domicile of the parties; and in default of any such domicile, in the parish where the principal immovable property of
the community was situated; and in default of both such domicile
and immovable property, in the parish where movable property
of the community was situated. The statute further declares
that it is remedial, and is to be applied retroactively "in all
instances where a judgment decreeing a partition of a pre-existing community of acquets and gains has not become final." (Emphasis added.) In Steere v. Marston75 the plaintiff wife left
the matrimonial domicile in Shreveport, moved to New Orleans,
and after a residence there of more than two years, obtained a
judgment of divorce against her husband. The judgment referred the parties to an Orleans notary for the purpose of effecting a partition. The defendant appealed suspensively from
this judgment. The latter was rendered, and the transcript of
appeal was lodged in the appellate court, prior to the effective
date of the statute. The appellant, however, contended inter alia
that the statute required a retroactive application, and that such
an application deprived the Orleans court of jurisdiction to order
a partition. The majority of the members of the Supreme Court
refused to accept this contention. To so construe the statute,
they reasoned, would render the statute unconstitutional as a legislative encroachment on judicial power. The chief justice and
two of his associates concurred in the result. The concurring
opinion of Justice McCaleb provides a more valid rationale for
the affirmance of the judgment. He disagreed with the reasons
advanced in the majority opinion, contending that:
"[T]he fixing or changing of venue in suits for a partition
of community property is a function properly residing in
the Legislature and the mere fact that it has made the Act
apply retroactively would not seem to be the exercise of
judicial power any more than an outright repeal of a statute
(on which a cause of action was based) pending the appeal
would constitute an encroachment upon judicial power. The
end result of the view announced by the majority is that the
74. La. Acts 1954, No. 448, §§ 1-5, p. 839, incorporated as LA. R.S. 13:4991
(1950).
75. 228 La. 94, 81 So.2d 822 (1955).
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appellate court has a vested right in not having the law
changed during the pendency of an appeal."7 6
The statute, he submitted, was inapplicable, as the judgment
complained of was final, though its execution was suspended by
the appeal.7 7 The Code distinction between "final" and "definitive" judgments7 offers rather convincing support of this view.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS

Only one case of general importance 79 in this area of the
procedural law of Louisiana was decided in the past term. The
defendant in Burton v. Lester" instituted a malpractice suit
in the United States court to recover damages for negligent
treatment by a physician. The suit was brought against the
physician's casualty insurer, a foreign corporation, under the
Louisiana direct action statute. While this suit was pending,
the physician, her husband, and her insurance carrier instituted
this action in the Louisiana court praying for a declaratory judgment: (1) declaring that the physician was not negligent; and
(2) if she were negligent, determining the damages sustained
by the defendant. The trial court dismissed the suit under an
exception of no cause of action, based on the contention that
the declaratory judgment statute did not extend to contested
litigation on the merits of ex delicto actions. The intermediate
appellate court certified the case to the Supreme Court, propounding eight questions to be answered. Rather than attempt
to answer these questions, the Supreme Court exercised its constitutional privilege of disposing of the case as if it had been
appealed thereto directly. It affirmed the judgment of the trial
76. 81 So.2d at 825.
77. Justices Hawthorne and Hamiter dissented from the refusal of the court
to grant a rehearing.
78. Final and definitive judgments have this in common: both decide points in
controversy relating to the merits of the case. But only the definitive judgment has
the force of res judicata, that is, which either has been affirmed on appeal or from
which no appeal can be prosecuted because the delay therefor has elapsed. Cf. LA.
CODE OF PRACTICE art. 539 (1870). See also LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 565 (1870),
providing that "One may appeal from all final judgments rendered in causes in
which an appeal is given by law, whether such judgments have been rendered after
hearing the parties, or by default." (Emphasis added.)
79. In MeLavy v. American Legion Housing Corp., 227 La. 300, 79 So.2d 316
(1955), the plaintiff prayed for a declaratory judgment relieving the purchasers
of homes from liability for sewerages imposed to service a bond issue floated to
construct the sewerage system. The case is of no general importance, however, as
it was disposed of simply through the application of the constitutional peremption
'barring attacks upon the validity of proceedings for the issuance of bonds after
sixty days.
80. 227 La. 347, 79 So.2d 333 (1955).
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court, relying upon the uniform decisions of all other American
jurisdictions holding that no declaratory judgment should be
rendered under these facts and circumstances. There can be no
quarrel with the court's decision in this respect. But unfortunately, the organ of the court goes further and says:
"[W]e do not believe that the statute should be employed as
a substitute for the well-defined actions provided for in our
Code of Practice or those which have been established by
jurisprudence unless, by reason of the special circumstances
of the case, the codal procedure does not furnish an adequate
remedy." 8'
And again, for emphasis the organ of the court adds:
"The Act is merely an adjunct to the civil procedure outlined in our Code of Practice of 1870 and should not be substituted therefor, save upon a showing by the litigants that
the ordinary or summary proceedings recognized in the law
82
and jurisprudence do not avail him an adequate remedy."
This dicta of the court comes very close to embracing the unfortunate rule of an extreme minority of American jurisdictions
that the declaratory action is an exclusive, rather than an alter83
native, remedy.
ABATEMENT OF ACTIONS

McConnell v. Webb 8 4 is the last chapter in the history of Louisiana's legislative efforts to prevent the adoption of the technical rules of the common law on abatement and survival of
actions, and the judicial results thereof. Adequate consideration
of this case requires a study of the legislative history of pertinent code and statutory provisions, and a comparative treatment of the civilian and common law backgrounds. Since limitations of space preclude an attempt at either here, and as recent
treatments of both are available,8 5 the reader is restfully referred
thereto for a critique of this case.
81. Id. at 353, 79 So.2d at 335.
82. Id. at 354, 79 So.2d at 335.
83. This point is discussed in Note, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 281, 282-84

(1953).
84. 226 La. 385, 76 So.2d 405 (1954).
85. Survey of 1954 Louisiana Legislation- Courts and Judicial Procedure, 15
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 38, 39-42 (1954) ; and Comment, Abatement of Actions
in Louisiana, 15 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 722 (1955).

